contradicts the pre-existing rights approach. Justice Scalia noted, "William Blackstone, for example, wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties, one of which was that they were not permitted to 'keep arms in their houses."' 5 The majority opinion here recognizes that there was no free exercise of religion in England. 6 Justice Scalia states that the purpose of the Amendment was to assure a "citizen's militia":
[P]etitioners' interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted codification of the right. If, as they believe, the Second Amendment right is no more than the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized militia, if, that is, the organized militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment's guarantee-it does not assure the existence of a "citizens' militia" as a safeguard against tyranny. 7 But as we will see, there never was a universal militia in England.
Toward the end of his opinion, Justice Scalia turns to the limitations on Second Amendment rights.' Once again, history is dispositive.
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. 9 He then relies on Blackstone:
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. [United States v.] Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those "in common use at the time." We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual weapons."' 0 Thus, the Heller majority purports to be based on pre-Amendment historical practice. We will see that its description of that practice is more mythical than real.
II. THE ENGLISH RIGHT TO KEEP ARMS-A PREVIEW
AND THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND
A. The Whig Supremacy
Before plunging into the histories of England in the eighteenth century, one should note that none of the histories of England examined for this Article mention the issue of gun rights per se. Gun ownership was an issue under the Game Laws and there were controversies over how inclusive the militia should be, but gun rights in themselves were simply not an issue. There was no National Rifle Association ("NRA"), no chronic incidents of mass shootings (because even a trained infantryman could shoot only three musket rounds per minute), no Brady organization, nor any legislation permitting open carry. There was no party split on gun issues because there was only the Whig Party. No one with any power wanted to arm the populace as a defense against the government, because those in power were happy with things as they were and did not want to rock the boat. As a member of Parliament perhaps expressed, "Reform, sir! Don't talk to one of reform-things are bad enough as they are." (Probably apocryphal.)
The eighteenth century was known as the era of Whig Supremacy, in which a ruling oligarchy, a society of connections, controlled Parliament, the judiciary, local government, the established church, hunting, and the militia." The Whigs purged the opposition, the Tories, both at national and local office.' 2 For our study, it is important that the Justices of the Peace (key to the enforcement of the Game Laws) and the Militia officers were all Whigs." high places." 2 2 During the eighteenth century, landed wealth became more "concentrated in the hands of an upper crust of great proprietors, whose numbers could be counted in hundreds rather than in thousands." 23 Locally, there was a government of the local oligarchies.
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For our purposes, this makes it hard to make generalizations that are true for all of England. The enforcement of the Game Laws and the organization of the militia varied widely from place to place.
5
The Whig elite knew that they were at the top of the social order by the will of God and that only they had the ability and duty to rule. 26 We may see this in Blackstone's introduction to his Commentaries where he describes the need for legal knowledge on the part of the elite in fulfilling their high social role." He starts by characterizing that class as "our gentlemen of independent estates and fortune, the most [useful] as well as [considerable] body of men in the nation."
28 Such gentlemen may be called upon to serve on a jury, more importantly they serve as Justices of the Peace: "And here a very ample field is opened for a gentleman to exert his talents, by maintaining good order in his neighbourhood; by [punishing] the [dissolute] and idle; by protecting the peaceable and [industrious]; and, above all, by healing petty differences and preventing vexatious [prosecutions] ." 29 Those in Parliament have a greater responsibility:
They are the guardians of the Englifh conflitution; the makers, repealers, and interpreters of the Englifh laws; delegated to watch, to check, and to avert every dangerous innovation, to propofe, to adopt, and to cherifh any folid and well-weighted improvement; bound by every tie of nature, of honour, and of religion, to tranfmit that conflitution and thofe laws to their pofterity, amended if poffible, at leaft without any derogation. 30 The elite have both the ability and the duty:
Yet vaft as this truft is, it can no where be fo properly repofed as in the noble hands where our excellent conflitution has placed it: and therefore placed it, becaufe, from the independence of their fortune and the dignity of their ftation, they are prefumed to employ that leifure which is the confequence of both, in attaining a more extenfive knowlege of the laws than perfons of inferior rank: and becaufe the founders of our polity relied upon that delicacy of fentiment, fo peculiar to noble birth; which, as on the one hand it will prevent either intereft or affection from interfering in queftions of right, fo on the other it will bind a peer in honour, an obligation which the law efteems equal to another's oath, to be mafter of thofe points upon which it is his birthright to decide. The Whig attitude is best exemplified today in the television series Downton Abbey, especially by Violet Crawley, the Dowager Countess of Grantham, and Lady Mary Crawley. A sense of the era can be gained by the modem reader by dialing back three hundred years, imagining the Crawleys of Downton Abbe-y in an era where their estates were prosperous and there were no serious challenges to their status. In all, Professor Porter writes: "For those safely above the poverty trap, the Georgian age was an exhilarating time to be alive.""
B. The English Right and its Limitations A Preview
The history of the English right to bear arms could be traced back at least as far as the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which stated that "the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law."" To put this in perspective, it's hard to conceive of a right of free speech that is only "allowed by law." So there are two stories of the right, one expansive and the other restrictive. In any case, Parliament was sovereign so it always had the power to limit a right. " [W] e may venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is [absolute] and without control." 34 One major restriction on any right to bear and keep arms was the Game Laws, which limited hunting to the landed elite. These laws are described in a wonderful book, Gentlemen and Poachers:
The eighteenth-century English game laws have long been synonymous with petty tyranny. By imposing a property qualification on sportsmen, they effectively denied all but countrymen the right to take game or even to possess a gun. Those who challenged the gentry's monopoly were fined or imprisoned, usually after only a summary hearing by the local justice of the peace. In the early nineteenth century, it was claimed that one out of every four inmates in England's prisons was an offender against the game laws.
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The Prohibition on poaching and on the instruments of poaching (for example, traps, dogs, and guns) is reminiscent of today's war on drugs. Although many were imprisoned, poaching continued, complete with shootouts between poachers and gamekeepers. Professor Munsche lists seventeen pages of anti-poaching laws in an appendix. 6 It has been estimated that only about one percent of the population had the land wealth necessary to be allowed to own a gun. 37 Note that the wealth had to be in land-a rich merchant who rented did not qualify. Gun rights did not exist in a large geographic area, the Scottish Highlands. 39 The threats posed to the English throne from Scottish Highlander attempts to restore the Stuart Dynasty resulted in prohibiting Highlanders from bearing arms.
4 0 In the wake of the first Jacobite Rebellion, the English realized that the Scottish clans and Highlanders were a threat to the throne. 4 44. MIERS, supra note 43, at 20. I met a kilt wearer in Scotland and remarked on the embroidered representation of a dirk on his kilt. He explained it was meant to represent the banned real dirk.
HOFSTR4 LAW REVIEW
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion in Heller mentions the Game Laws or the disarming of the Highlands. 45 The majority does, however, cite to Blackstone, 4 6 who wrote that the English have had a right to bear arms. 47 But can we rely on Blackstone? He also said that in a democracy there can be no sovereignty without suffrage, which he then goes on to qualify by reasoning that the right to vote should be limited to those who have enough wealth to enable them to make an independent judgment. 48 Both the right to vote and the right to anns were, in reality, limited to a small percentage of the population. The limitation on the right to vote was justified by the theory of "virtual representation," that members of parliament would represent the entire realm, even if elected by only a small part of the realm's subjects. I have been toying with the idea that the right to bear arms was virtual; all had the right, but it was exercised by the few who bore arms for all.
III. THE ENGLISH LEGACY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

A. The Indeterminism of the Determinism of Historical Originalism
Both sides in Heller agreed that the Second Amendment had to be understood in historical terns and that the determinative history included the British as well as the American past. Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm entitled her amicus brief for Heller as "The Right Inherited from England." 4 9 Professor Malcolm starts her brief by citing Robertson v. Baldwin" for her claim that the Bill of Rights was "simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors."-
5
The Briefs "Summary Argument" opens as follows: "Over a century ago, this Court declared it 'perfectly well settled' that the Bill of Rights was 'not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors. ' 54 The assumption that the Constitution's drafters only enacted established rights in the Bill of Rights is patently false, as shown by the First Amendment, which rejects the establishment and provides for the free exercise of religion.
In England the Episcopal Church was established, while Catholics, dissenting Protestants, and Jews were subject to many disabilities." But the assumption that historical originalism is the key to understanding the Second Amendment remains.
So both advocates for gun rights and advocates against them insist that the "English Legacy" is crucial-but both also completely disagree as to what that legacy was. It is strange that something that is seen to be so determinative can be so indeterminate. As we shall see, I conclude that the English law of gun rights and control revolved around English issues of social class and politics that were totally different than the issues that preoccupied Americans. 57 English history cannot control our Constitution. 7 ' He thus started the contemporary emphasis on the right of insurrection, which according to supporters of gun rights was one of the Amendment's purposes.n Thus, the gun rights controversy morphed into a part of the culture wars. In the mid-1990s, the Republican Party, under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, joined in the fight, promising to work for the repeal of the assault weapons ban." Gingrich distinguished between liberal and conservative views on control: "Generally, liberals neither understand nor believe in the constitutional right to bear arms. . . . For some psychological reason, liberals are antigun but not anti-violent criminal."' Professor Siegel characterizes the NRA and political right view of the Second Amendment as one that "unmistakably" imagines society as divided into "law-abiding citizens" and the "criminal," the "deserving" and "undeserving," and resents governmental "identification with the undeserving other.""'
B. The American Dichotomy
In 1996, Wayne LaPierre recruited Charlton Heston to replace the then-current NRA president." Heston traced the Amendment back to the American Revolution, adding a component of racial inheritance: "And no amount of oppressioi, no FBI, no IRS, no big government, no social 82 Heston thus placed gun rights firmly in the center of white, male, middle-class Evangelicals who were being attacked in the culture wars."
American culture thus became polarized between those who saw guns as being a central component of American manhood and those who did not. This American gun culture has, as we will see, nothing to do with the role of guns in England prior to the adoption of the Second Amendment.
IV. THE COMPONENTS OF THE ENGLISH LEGACY
The current American views on a right to bear arms are a recent development in our history, part of the culture wars that inform our contemporary political struggles. The Second Amendment's meaning, however, is cast as deriving from English law. This Article discusses four components of the English law on guns: the English Declaration of Rights of 1687,84 the writings of Blackstone," the Game Laws," and the Militia."
A. The English Declaration of Rights
The English Declaration of Rights ("Declaration") was in effect a negotiated agreement between Parliament and the King-to-be William III of the Netherlands, on his taking of the throne of England after the removal of James II." The Declaration represented the agreed upon division of powers between the new King and Parliament. 89 The final version of the Declaration's arms provision read as follows: "That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their Defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by Law.""o Professor Lois G. Schwoerer points out that the Declaration was drafted in the context of the English Protestant struggle against Catholicism and thus it was the Protestants who were to be armed in a collective defense against Catholics.
9 1 Those in favor and those against individual gun rights have engaged in a furious debate over the meaning of the Declaration's language. Does it give Protestants the individual right to bear arms, or does it give Protestants only a collective right to have a militia? Arguments and counter-arguments are made, based on a micro-analysis of the language of the legislative history, and the historical background, as well as later English cases (though there are not many). Heller condenses this extensive, technical, and hyper-analytical debate to a sentence: "It was clearly an individual right, having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia." Malcolm starts with the assumption that the Declaration created an individual right to bear arms.
92.
10 2 She characterizes the evolution of the English right of citizens to be armed as "unusual," because of its inception as a duty. 03 At the convention debating the Declaration, "[c]onvention members expressed their outrage at the disarmament of law-abiding subjects during the reigns of Charles and James."' 04 We now turn to Professors Charles's and Malcolm's opposite interpretations of the debates and proposals in the convention. We start with a speech by Thomas Erle (perhaps never delivered) which proposed that "[blesides the militia arms it will be convenient that every man that hath E10 and every substantial householder in any town or city should be provided of a good musket in case of an invasion."o 5 Malcolm writes that Erle's "suggestion, or something very like it" must have been on the convention members' minds, for it mirrors "the first version of the arms article, which declared that Protestants 'should provide and keep arms for their common defence.""'" Charles reads Erle's language differently, viewing the change to "may have arms" as "articulating that having arms was an allowance by law-not a right per se."o 7 Despite the continued reference to arms "for 'their common Defence,"' to Malcolm, the substitution of "may" for "should" signaled a shift away from the "public duty" to be armed and asserted more emphasis on the right to arms as an "individual right."'.
Charles sees the purpose of Erle's proposal to be enabling every Protestant's duty to "protect against invasion."' 0 9 Moreover, Charles reads Erle's limitation of the extension of the right to "substantial householders" as having the best interest of the nation in mind by allowing arms for those "that have estates of their own," providing arms only to those who meet certain hierarchical and socio-economical Now we come to the dropping of "common" from "common defence" and the addition of "suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law."" 2 The revised arms article now read: "That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defense suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law."" 3 Note that this language restricts the right to Protestants (not Catholics) and makes the right subject to Parliament, not the King.
Professor Malcolm concludes: "[T]he rephrasing shifted the emphasis away from the public duty to be armed and toward the keeping of arms solely as an individual right."l 4 Professor Malcolm assumes, without discussion, that this provision granted an individual right to arms."' In support of this assertion, she cites to the Commons Journal: "The Commons Journal records without explanation a new version of the article on the right of individuals to have arms.""' She concludes that the convention "finally came down squarely, and exclusively, in favour of an individual right to have arms for self-defence.""' Further, she notes that "militia" was completely left out of the Declaration as well as any reference to "common, as opposed to individual, defence.""' Professor Malcolm sees the addition of "as allowed by Law" as a compromise, the product of practical politics. '' 9 She does note that with the Game Act and the Militia Act still in force, this right to bear arms "seems empty rhetoric." 20 She then retreats from this obvious conclusion, which would totally obliterate her thesis, stating that the final draft of the Declaration was a compromise: "[T]he arms article declared a right that current law negated, with the understanding that future legislation would eliminate the discrepancy.""2 Charles, on the other hand, places more emphasis on the change to "may" have arms being conditioned on the addition of "suitable to their condition as allowed by Law." 22 He sees the addition as providing "an allowance by law-not a right per se," finding that " right to arms, but a right for the militia to defend against a tyrannical government.12 The frequent use of "condition" in weapon, game, and militia laws expresses the hierarchical and socio-economic status-the "chain of being," on which the "right" was based.1 2 4 Citing to books, pamphlets, and the literature of the time, Charles finds the meanings of "arms for their common defence" and "arms for their defence" were the same, both referring to the rights of the militia.' 25 Professor Schworer gives another explanation, that the right granted by the Declaration was medieval in that it "was exclusive-not held by everyone. Such a right was dependent upon property, status, or gift."
In Heller, Justice Scalia concludes without discussion that the Declaration gave individuals a right.1 27 "It was clearly an individual right, having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia. 3 We see this in the areas of the right to bear arms, the right to hunt game, the right to a jury, the right of representation, and the right to sit in Parliament.
The Heller opinion does not mention it, but Blackstone's discussion of the Game Laws notes how these laws limit the populace's right to arms.1 34 Blackstone, as we will see, typically starts by affirming a right and then goes on to state that that right is limited in society.
13 5 in any case, as noted by the Commentaries, Parliament is sovereign, which prevents any judicial enforcement of any right against parliamentary law.' Blackstone describes the Game Laws in his discussion of the criminal laws of England:
Lastly, there is another offence, fo conftituted by a variety of acts of parliament, which are fo numerous and fo confufed, and the crime itfelf of fo queftionable a nature, that I fhall not detain the reader with many obfervations thereupon. And yet it is an offence which the fportfmen of England feem to think of the higheft importance; and a matter, perhaps the only one, of general and national concern: affociations having been formed all over the kingdom to prevent it's deftructive progrefs. I mean the offence of deftroying fuch beafts and fowls, as are ranked under the denomination of game .... But the laws, called the game laws, have alfo inflicted additional punifhments (chiefly pecuniary) on perfons guilty of this general offence, unlefs they be people of fuch rank or fortune as is therein particularly fpecified. All perfons therefore, of what property or diftinction foever, that kill game out of their own territories, or even upon their own eftates, without the king's license expreffed by the grant of a franchife, are guilty of the firft original offence, of encroaching on the royal prerogative. And thofe indigent perfons who do fo, without having fuch rank or fortune as is generally called a qualification, are guilty not only of the original offence, but of the aggravations alfo, created by the ftatutes for preferving the game: which aggravations are fo feverely punished, and thofe punishments fo implacably inflicted, that the offence againft the king is feldom thought of, provided the miferable delinquent can make his peace with the lord of the manor. This offence, thus aggravated, I have ranked under the prefent head, becaufe the only rational footing upon which we can confider it as a crime, is that in low and indigent perfons it promotes idlenefs, and takes them away from their proper employments and callings; which is an offense againft the public police and economy of the commonwealth.1
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These laws exist despite the fact that everyone has the natural right to hunt game:
In the firft place then we have already fhewn, and indeed it cannot be denied, that by the law of nature every man, from the prince to the peafant, has an equal right of purfuing, and taking to his own ufe, all fuch creatures as are ferae naturae, and therefore the property of nobody, but liable to be feifed by the firft occupant.
But in society, the right to take wild animals is limited:
But it follows from the very end and conflitution of fociety, that this natural right, as well as many others belonging to man as an individual, may be reftrained by pofitive laws enacted for reafons of ftate, or for the fuppofed benefit of the community. . . . [I]n confequence of this authority, we find that the municipal laws of many nations have exerted fuch power of reftraint; have in general forbidden the entering on another man's grounds, for any caufe, without the owner's leave, have extended their protection to fuch particular animals as are ufually the objects of purfuit; and have invefted the prerogative of hunting and taking fuch animals in the fovereign of the ftate only, and fuch as he fhall authorize.1 39 And, in a passage that directly contradicts any right to bear arms, Blackstone writes:
Many reafons have concurred for making thefe conftitutions: as, 1. For the encouragement of agriculture and improvement of lands, by giving every man an exclufive dominion over his own foil. 2. For prefervation of the feveral fpecies of thefe animals, which would foon be extirpated by a general liberty. 3. For prevention of idlenefs and diffipation in hufbandment, artificers, and others of lower rank; which would be the unavoidable confequence of univerfal licenfe. 4. Kennedy also points out that, to Blackstone, holders of absolute rights become holders of only relative rights as members of society.' 43 This contract between abstract rights and reality shows up again in the right of representation and the right to a jury.
Blackstone's own involvement in voting disputes shows the disconnect between his rhetoric and reality. The issue was whether copyholders by inheritance, rather than holding at the will of the lord of the manor, could vote.' 44 To Blackstone, voting could be and was restricted to those with a certain property qualification.'
4 5 This was justified because only those with sufficient wealth could be trusted to vote for the good of the country, rather than out of narrow self-interest. ' A bill to settle this question was introduced in Parliament and Blackstone prepared what today would be called a position statement against such copyhold voting.' 4 7 Blackstone used a historical approach that would have done Justice Scalia proud. He summarized fifteenth century statutes and described the four main types of feudal terms and concluded that the copyholders by inheritance were not "freeholds" or "free lands." 48 The issue was a complicated one, one which a traditional freehold might refer to lands or to the type of terns by which the lands were held. A tenant for life had a freehold interest, but only those holding lands "in free socage" enjoyed freehold tenure." ' Blackstone stated that customary freeholds were of such a nature.so Blackstone's analysis in his legal brief opens with an affinnation that "'in every free state' each member of 'the community . . . ' If you have been following so far, there is a right to vote, except for the justifiable exception for those with not enough property. But Blackstone in real life took part in a scheme to allow the propertyless to vote.1 54 His motivation was not to enlarge the franchise, but to help his candidate, the Earl of Abingdon.' 5 5 The local franchise was confined to tenants of sixty-one town properties, called "burgage tenements." Blackstone came up with and implemented a plan to acquire seven burgage tenements and thirty-eight leases; "trusty Friends" of Abingdon's would be granted leases before the election, enabling them to vote, and then the leaseholds would be returned afterwards.
5 7 Thus, Blackstone laid down the rule (everyone has a right to vote), along with its exception (actually only those with property qualifications), and then subverted the rule(s) of his Commentaries with a successful scheme to subvert the exception.' Wilfred Prest notes that he never showed any unease in his position and his taking benefits for the corruption of the election.'1 5
In other words, regardless of what Blackstone wrote, as a practicing lawyer, he came up with a scheme to get around it and elect his patron.
Blackstone's own election to Parliament was both convoluted and corrupt. Lord Fitzmaurice, acting as Blackstone's aristocratic patron, arranged to have Lord Bute, (who had the disposal of the borough of Hindon "a thoroughly corrupt 'potwalloper' constituency") agree to come up with the money to pay off the Hindon electors.' There was a problem, however-Blackstone did not meet the qualification to be a borough member of Parliament because his property was personal, not real."' He solved the problem by buying an annuity on landed security Blackstone's sensitivity to the adaptability of the common law protects Blackstone from "[t]he claim that Blackstone regarded the law as fixed for all time." If so, however, it convicts Blackstone of the inconsistency, indeed, the plain dishonesty, of resting his defence of judicial power on the supposed binding force of legal rules whose plasticity he knew well.
Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CONSIDERATIONS ON COPYHOLDERS (1755)
)
15
Langbein further states, There was, however, a much deeper flaw in Blackstone's account of the allocation of power between judge and jury. As so often in the Commentaries, Blackstone's account was formalistic, in the sense of describing the nominal power relationships, while failing to acknowledge what he and other lawyers of his day knew to be the actual division of power and influence. 176 Langbien concludes: " [D] espite all the strengths of Blackstone's Commentaries, the work is simply too unreliable to merit the deference it tends to be accorded.""' Professor Michael Hoeflich explores the reception of Blackstone into American law in his American Blackstones. 1' He explains that there were many versions, not just one, of the Commentaries in America. 179 These were of two types, the first being the reissue of the English editions without change (and without royalty payments). ' The second was the publication of the Saint George Tucker, the only man who signed both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, edited the first Blackstone that was adapted "to the Constitution and laws of the federal government of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia."' Tucker explained that "the revolution which separated the present United States of America from Great Britain . . . produced a corresponding revolution not only in the principles of our government, but in the laws."l 8 4 He continued, "Many parts of the laws of England are also either obsolete, or have been deemed inapplicable to our local circumstances and policy." ' The bare quotations of Blackstone in the NRA brief by Malcolm and the Heller opinion both totally miss the fact that interpreting Blackstone's exposition of the English law is complicated and his theory and practice were not identical. The Heller majority opinion evidences a complete misunderstanding of Blackstone's Commentaries and his society.
C. The Game Laws
The Social Context
Professor Munsche in his history of the English Game Laws, Gentlemen and Poachers, explains that there were a multitude of laws that governed "the pursuit of animals for sport in this period," and regulated the use of guns in that pursuit. 1 1 6 He lists one and a half pages of "Principal statutes, 1275-1831" in small print, and a fourteen page "guide to the laws" relating to deer, rabbits and game for 1660-1831, broken down by offenses committed by any persons and those committed by an unqualified person, the law applicable to gamekeepers, and the applicable enforcement procedure.
7
The purpose of all these laws was to grant the landed upper class a monopoly on hunting.' 8 They made hunting and the possession of the means to hunt into crimes.' As such, they conflicted with any right to keep and bear arms that might have existed. Professor Munsche points out that the militia was to protect against arbitrary government by making a standing army unnecessary and thus preventing the king from governing without Parliament.'" The militia did not supplant the regular army, "but the conviction persisted in many quarters that English liberty was dependent on the existence of an armed and vigilant yeomanry. This obviously ran counter to the spirit of the Game Act.""' Gentlemen and Poachers studies those who "defended and enforced" the Game Laws and those who broke them.' 9 2 From the work we are able to gain a deeper insight into the state of the world in of eighteenth century England-clearly showing how different that world is from ours and what made it so different from our own. Professor Munsche points out that the Game Laws were not just hunting regulations, but had an all-important social dimension, in creating an identity for the gentry.' The Game Laws were the creation of the gentry-"[t]hey wrote the game laws, benefited from them, defended them, enforced them -and they led the fight for their repeal. social condition and legislation and that those permitted to hunt were also the minority permitted to vote, be members of Parliament, and be officers in the militia. For the ruling class it was simply the natural order.
The gentry and the majority of the English population, however, had completely different view of the Game Laws' legitimacy: "Indeed, the vast majority of the population had never really accepted the gentry's right to a monopoly on game; they continued to believe that hares, partridges and pheasants 'were ordained from the beginning free for anyone who could overtake them."" 9 5 The country gentlemen, however, believed that society was benefitted because the poor were prevented from developing habits of idleness, while at the same time rewarding "men who gave freely of their time and fortunes in the service of their community. In other words, the Game Laws were measures designed to preserve a stable society, one which was rural-based, hierarchical and paternalist.""'
With both sides-the gentry and the rural common folk-believing that they had a God-given right to either have the game for themselves or to hunt freely, the problem of poaching was endemic and intractable. In many ways, the "war on poaching" resembled our own "war on drugs." It was an unwinnable and ever-escalating conflict, a problem with no solution.
We may have the idea that poachers captured game to feed their families, but many sold their catch. It was the selling that distinguished the poacher from the sportsman. Selling game violated "one of the cardinal rules of sportsmanship in the eighteenth century."l 97 Not only was selling game not sporting, it was also a "threat to social order."'
98
To most country gentlemen, it seemed that the necessity of working for a living was the only thing that kept the poor from idleness. "Without the discipline of constant labour . .. the lower classes would . . . sink into lives of crime and debauchery" leading inevitably to society's decay.' 99 Poaching was more than an activity of poor rustics trying to feed their families, it had the characteristics of modem day organized crime. Armed gangs made regular raids and once caught and sold, the game was transported from the country to cities using a distribution system that took the hares and pheasants from the country estates to the urban IOFSTRA LAW REVIEW centers. In the last half of the eighteenth century, road improvements and the creation of stage and mail coaches brought most towns within a day of London.
2 0 The coachmen operated outside of regulation and bought game to market without much risk to themselves. 20 ' So underneath the multiple cloaks of the coachman, a popular image from Regency romance novels, there often were rabbits and pheasants. 202 The financial incentive for the distribution system was a significant markup-"[i]n the 1820s ... poulterers sold game for two or two-and-a-half times the amount paid to the poacher." 203 The trade became so vital to poulterers that they joined together to pay for the defense of their members who were charged with the sale of game.
20 4 The actions of the middlemen were made illegal in 1707, when "any higgler, chapman, carrier, innkeeper, victualler or alehousekeeper" was forbidden "to buy, sell or possess game under pain of a £5 fine (per head of game) or three months in prison." 205 This Act, however, like many of our drug laws, was ineffective.
The illegal, but profitable trade attracted informants and blackmailers. These groups, of course, supported the Game Laws. Those in the trade, like the drug dealers today or the bootleggers during prohibition, enjoyed the higher profits that the Game Acts made possible. 206 Many poachers worked as individuals or in families, but in the later part of the eighteenth century, there was a rise in poaching gangs who were armed and sometimes killed informants. 207 There were even pitched gunfights between poachers and gamekeepers. 2 s Like our drug laws, the Act of 1755 banning the game trade gave poachers a monopoly on the supply end. 209 Poaching went "from a craft, it was turning into a business -one which occupied large numbers of men and was capable of yielding large rewards." The game laws were born out of a desire to enhance the status of country gentlemen in in the bitter aftermath of the Civil War. Their message was that land was superior to money, a blunt assertion of privilege which for a long time accepted, or at least was not openly contradicted.
2 1
For the ruling class it was simply the natural order.
The Enforcement of the Game Laws a. Fines and Imprisonment
Legal process was divided between those conducted in informal sessions before Justices of the Peace and the trials before the QuarterSessions.
2 12 Both were presided over, of course, by the landowning gentry (the same people who could vote, command the militia, and serve in Parliament), who wanted to preserve their monopoly on game.
213 Both proceedings were limited in the power to punish; the poacher could be fined and if the fine were not paid, he could be whipped and confined to jail for up to a few months. 214 The judges in the Quarter-Sessions were also drawn from the gentry, but the indictment and findings of guilty and innocence were in the hands of a grand and petty jury. 215 Another alternative was for plaintiffs (often game associations) to bring a civil suit against poachers.
1
The expense of these suits could be ruinous for the plaintiff or the defendant, and thus were usually settled. Instruments for catching game, such as snares, nets, dogs, and guns were subject to seizure under the Game Laws. 2 1 1 It is here that we come to the conflict between the Game Laws and the right (if there were such a right) to keep and bear arms. The details of that conflict will be discussed below. 219 Authorities could, and did, seize guns.220 A warrant was required for the search and seizure of guns. process of obtaining a specific warrant, some counties issued general warrants. 2 22 These warrants provided "for the seizure of any gun, dog, net or 'engine' kept by an unqualified person."
223
Professor Munsche doubts the effectiveness of these attempts to disarm the English.
24
The prevalence of news articles involving shooting and the openness of gun possession by the unqualified argues against wholesale disarmament.2 2 5 Dogs, however, as instruments of hunting, were subject to seizure and destruction, ordered by the gentry and the nobles. 226 The steward of the Duke of Devonshire gave notice to the Duke's tenants "if any of them keep any Dogs that destroy game, unless they dispose of them immediately, I have ordered the Keeper .. . to shoot them. Another enforcement mechanism was the impressment of poachers into the Navy.
228 Impressments were not a formal punishment until 1800, but some poachers were singled out.
2 29
Professor Munsche concludes that it was difficult to say how many poachers were pressed, but it did happen.
One poet wrote: if hunting rifles and dogs were taken away and hunting outlawed. Their universal answer is that the enforcers would be shot.
The Game Laws and the English Bill of Rights
The Game Laws were not mentioned explicitly in the Bill of Rights, but these laws did conflict-if one assumes an individual right to bear arms had been created-with the Bill of Rights. The purpose of the militia and the Game Laws were in conflict. Professor Munsche writes:
The purpose of [the formation of a militia] was to make the establishment of a "standing army" unnecessary, and thus prevent the Crown from acquiring the means to govern without Parliament. In practice, the militia failed to supplant the regular army, but the conviction persisted in many quarters that English liberty was dependent on the existence of an armed and vigilant yeomanry. This obviously ran counter to the spirit of the game act. One of its opponents protested that it would "arm the mob." 241 Similar to the 1692 Act, guns were also omitted from the 1706 Act.
24 2 Professor Munsche states that the law was unclear. 24 3 Guns could "be seized by the lord of the manor, but subsequent statutes did not say whether an unqualified person could be prosecuted simply for having a flintlock or a pistol in his possession." 2 44 Did the omission of "guns" mean that possession of them was permitted, or were guns included in the term "engines"? Professor Malcolm argues that "guns" were not covered at all by the new Act. 245 She assumes that "engines" did not include guns and explains any conflicting evidence as confusion.
24 6 She supports this assertion by pointing out that the conservatives who controlled Parliament were willing to concede to the right to have weapons and to do away with the prohibition against firearms from the new act. Charles's analysis of these cases is that they only banned guns if used for hunting game, but did not rule that there was any individual right to have a gun. "At no time did it stipulate that having arms was a right."
254 My earlier point about the lack of controversy and debate about any conflict between the Game Laws and the Declaration bears repeating. The negative evidence tells us that supposed conflict did not exist in the minds of Englishmen. It took till 1739-fifty years after the Declaration-to get a definitive ruling on whether or not the Game Laws banned gun possession per se. 256 The purpose of these laws was to enhance and preserve the status of country gentlemen and maintain their superiority to the moneyed interests.
2 57 "Their message was that land was superior to money."
As such, these acts were more than sport regulation, they were social legislation-to preserve and protect a way of life. To allow the lower classes to hunt would take from the yeoman "respectful submission and manly dependence."
59
If game were saleable, it was thought by the gentry that country gentlemen would be degraded into "men who were not mindful of 'gentlemanlike and liberal feelings' but interested only in 'paultry profit."' 2 " 0 The Game Reform Act of 1831, which radically changed the Game Laws, then, represented not just a change in the law, but a change in society.
2 61 "In a world where everything had its price, there was little room for tradition, loyalty, or deference."
It is hard, if not impossible, to figure out exactly how the Game Laws affected any right to keep and bear arms, but one thing is clearone could not use a gun (or a dog) to hunt game. Heller states that there is a right to hunt in the Second Amendment, 26 3 but there is no basis for that right in English history. Looking at the social purpose of the Game Laws, we realize that the basic flaw with studying "The English Legacy" in order to interpret the Second Amendment is that English society from the Declaration to 1792 (the date of the Second Amendment) was a totally different social system than ours, then or now. Focusing on particular individual aspects of English laws, such as the Declaration or the amendment of the Game Act just misses the point. It is trying to figure out how one system works by studying another system. A jet engine works the same way as steam engine on a high level of abstraction-but they are different systems. "The English Legacy" is useless as an interpretative tool for the meaning of the Second Amendment.
D. The English Militia
Since the Second Amendment begins with an assertion of the necessity of a well-regulated militia, 264 a study of the English militia should inform the Amendment's meaning, but it does not. After reviewing the hapless history of the English militia, it is hard to see how a militia is necessary for the security of a free state. In England and America, diligent practice and drill were essential for the infantryman to execute orders effectively.
2 5 A militia could not stand up to a regular army. 266 The English militia in the period from the Glorious Revolution until 1792 (and after) was bound up with the Whig Supremacy.
2 6 7 The officers had to meet a landed property qualification and formed part of the local magistracy that was a central component to the Whig dominance. 268 Unlike the army, the militia was not subject to the king.
269
It was never a universal militia, nor was it a substitute for the army.
2 70
The militia of the eighteenth century represents two related military tendencies: it was an attempt both to create a reserve formation for home defence and to use an obligation of military service on the citizen the basis for recruiting. Political factors made it impossible to introduce true conscription and necessary to keep the militia distinct from the army, which led to various inconveniences. . . . It may fairly be claimed that the militia was an expedient proportioned to the extent of the danger to be met. It is not true that the danger was imaginary and the militia superfluous; at the same time there were good reasons for avoiding revolutionary measures like full conscription.
271
As in the prior sections, there will be a counterpoint between history as told by Professor Malcolm and Heller on one hand, and historical sources on the other. Malcolm and Heller both speak of a universal militia, but there never was an actual universal militia in England, nor did the dominant governing establishment want one.
Justice Scalia in Heller states:
Besides ignoring the historical reality that the Second Amendment was not intended to lay down a "novel principl[e]" but rather codified a right "inherited from our English ancestors," petitioners' interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted codification of the right. If, as they believe, the Second Amendment right is no more than the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized militia, the organized militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment's guarantee-it does not assure the existence of a "citizens' militia" as a safeguard against tyranny. For Congress retains plenary authority to organize the militia, which must include the authority to say who will belong to the organized force. ... Thus, if petitioners are correct, the Second Amendment protects citizens' right to use a gun in an organization from which Congress has plenary authority to exclude them. It guarantees a select militia of the sort the Stuart kings found useful, but not the people's militia that was the concern of the founding generation. The militia draft was always limited-there was never a universal arming of the people. Recruits were chosen by lot; and, if chosen, one could buy himself out by paying a fine of f 10 or finding a substitute. 8 One could even buy militia insurance, which would indemnify those who were "unlucky in the ballot." 2 8 4 In 1762, insurance against being called up was forbidden, except where confined to one parish.
2 " This law was repealed in 1786, after which commercial insurance was again available. 286 From 1762 on, public funds gave poor men f5 to find substitutes or pay the fine.
287
[P]opular hostility to military service was not got rid of. Attempts to move towards it were felt as a grievance and were apt unseasonably to remind the people that they had other grievances as well. The arming of the manhood of the nation at large by a regime which was fairly liberal and yet not democratic was bound to be a delicate operation. The aversion of the people to being armed gave their rulers a salutary early warning of this, and only under extreme pressure from Napoleon did they make a half-hearted attempt. Thus for political no less for economic and administrative reasons it was not possible to advance to a true system of national military training from the quaint simulacrum of it that was the militia. Once called, the militia was chronically insubordinate-"[o]fficers seem to have felt themselves to be on the edge of a volcano." 289 Officers, not surprisingly were in short supply. Officers were to be men of property: "The authors of the earlier militia acts had intended that the militia should be commanded by men of property, and that as far as possible all men of property should take their turn," but few men of property could neglect their private affairs for long and either resigned or did not serve. 29 0 Thus, there was "a pennanent shortage of officers." 29 ' "[A] natural source of supply was to be found in the sons of noblemen and wealthy gentlemen, who had neither to care for an estate nor earn a living." 2 9 2 But "[y]oung men of the better class often proved unfit for responsible posts. They were commonly unused to hard work and to the complicated financial dealings which even the command of a The militia resembled the Church of England in providing employment for the sons of the oligarchy.
2 94 As such, the militia's martial fervor was similar to the religious fever of the Anglican Church of that time.
5
The officers were the achilles heel of the militia. The men were satisfactory material, and in wartime at least they were not too badly trained. But they were so badly led that it is doubtful if they could have faced seasoned troops with any hope of success. . . . [T] he bulk of the offices were likely to be raw or disreputable or too old or absent .... 296 The militia's main virtue was that it was cheap; but even so it was underfunded.
2 9 7 The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century is replete with instances of undersupply.
2 9 8 Arms wore out before their scheduled replacement, and the replacements were tardy. 299 Ammunition became unusable.
3 00 The quality of arms was such that they were frequently unable to fire. 30 ' Militia members were given supplies, such as clothing, and were at least supposed to be paid, but all too frequently supplies were short and material, including arms and ammunition, wore out and were not replaced. The militia did have a social and political function. The militia guarded prisoners of war, chased smugglers, watched against possible invasions (which never took place), and suppressed riots. 303 The militia, however, itself caused riots when lists were promulgated of men liable for militia duty. 304 Far from being a community force, militias were stationed outside their own counties "so that they would never be called on to fight their friends and relations." 30 5 it provided positions for the wealthier landed gentry who comprised a substantial portion of the officer class. 306 It fit in with the period of Whig Ascendancy; the Whigs wanting political power in their hands, and not in the King's. 307 Since the King commanded the regular Army, the militia served as a counterweight and provided the high-landed gentry with power, position, and patronage. 3 08 Thus the Militia Acts were similar to Game Laws, which limited hunting to the higher gentry and the ability to vote which the required landed wealth.
In conclusion, the English Militia vacillated between two extremes. At one extreme, it would have abolished the national forces:
The national government would have ceased to control the armed forces of the state: neither the king nor any other central authority would have had the means to enforce obedience to their commands in the county. It is not surprising that Charles II vetoed the militia bill of 1678, modest though it was. 309 The opposite extreme was that the militia would be adjunct of the regular army, being in the same position as our National Guard for the Armed Forces. The resistance to any general call-up and the desire of the local oligarchs prevented this from happening.
3 10 But "popular hostility to military service was not got rid of. . . . The aversion of the people to bring armed" prevented "a true system of national military training from the quaint simulacrum of it that was the militia."" The militia burdened the poorer subjects by their being liable to call-ups and paying taxes to support it. 312 Since someone called up could buy his way out or pay a substitute, the militia draft was actually a randomly imposed tax. The militia riots were the most compelling symptom of their resentment. Professor Western describes the fundamental economic and social change that made the militia obsolete:
There was a deeper reason why the quarrels over the militia died down-the palpable obsolescence of the backward-looking radical ideals which had inspired the militia's revival. Rapid social change made it hard for even the most resolute backwoodsman to go on taking them seriously. As opponents of the militia agitation had never tired of pointing out, the ideal of a citizen army, with men of property filling the ranks, had been made incapable of realisation by the development Heller performed the second step of imaginative transposition, but the imagination stemmed from the Hollywood West of "stand your ground," rather than the Georgian Age. Heller just does not work as an exercise in historical interpretation, but instead functions as an example of how not to apply history to the Constitution.
